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While the traditional form of electricity generation and supply is based on centralized structures with large-scale
power plants, the objective of a strongly decentralized form of energy supply is increasingly becoming of importance.
Sustainability-oriented energy transitions are relying on various sorts of renewable energies coupled with energy
efficiency initiatives. In the current existing regulatory and market frameworks in Germany and elsewhere, important
technical and institutional innovations for energy transitions were and are being developed, tested, and brought to
application on regional and local levels. Regions, cities, and villages experimenting with socio-technical innovations and
aiming to implement new concepts have to develop governance structures under high uncertainty. These governance
structures mirror space-specific social, political, technological, and economic constellations. The present paper
introduces an analytical approach for studying emergent forms of governance and uses four cases from Germany
to apply the approach. Research is based on a comparative case study research design, using primarily expert interviews
and document analysis as data sources. The cases demonstrate that sustainable energy transitions are driven forward
by a variety of actors with different aims and interests, culminating in the development of space-specific technological
mixes and situative governance structures. Sustainable energy transitions are not following a master plan or are coordinated
on a national level. The upper political levels and external events pose severe constraints for the implementation of
local transition initiatives. Future research should further aim to highlight and analyze the contentious character of local
energy transitions.
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Introduction
While the traditional form of electricity generation and
supply is based on centralized structures with large-scale
power plants, the objective of a strongly decentralized form
of energy supply is increasingly becoming of importance.
In the current existing regulatory and market frameworks
in Germany and elsewhere, important technical and institu-
tional innovations for sustainable energy transitions were
and are being developed, tested, and brought to application
on regional and local levels. Regions, cities, and villages
experimenting with socio-technical innovations and aim-
ing to implement new concepts have to develop govern-
ance structures under high uncertaintya. These governance
arrangements, which have yet to be tested for their persistence* Correspondence: Gerhard.fuchs@sowi.uni-stuttgart.de
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reproduction in any medium, provided the origand functionality, mirror space-specific social, political,
technological, and economic constellations [1].
In this context, the article analyzes the development of
decentralized situational governance as a basis for innovation
impulses for the sustainable transformation of the electricity
system in Germany. Assuming that local, urban, and regional
governance structures develop in conflict with the estab-
lished structures of the field ‘electricity generation’, the art-
icle analyzes a range of German initiatives as ‘strategic
action fields’, within which socio-technical innovations are
being developed. Based on the recent theory by Fligstein
and McAdam [2,3], the paper stresses the importance of
the actions of so-called challenger actors, which eventually
might contribute with their activities to a change in the
overall system of electricity generation. The article thus
treats the city or any local entity not as a given unit, but
looks at the actors or coalition of actors who want to
change existing structures. They are challenging the estab-
lished status quo.This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
inal work is properly credited.
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preted in the literature as small experimental ‘niches’: con-
strained, but also enabled, by wider social and political
structures and developments [4]. Niche innovations may
lead nowhere, or even serve to reinforce the status quo.
Equally, however, they can have far wider implications as
well. Implications are hard to predict in advance, since
they are dependent on new cognitive frames, changing
economic and political power constellations and innova-
tive measures to become effective. Insofar, it is of eminent
importance to look at the actors and their resources, their
position within the field under investigation for evaluating
their actions, and their potential contribution to a trans-
formation of the electricity system towards more sustain-
ability. The article will look more closely at four cases and
ask what actors are present in the fields and what the dom-
inant lines of conflict they are engaged in look like. Energy
transitions are concerned with the change of established
structures and institutions. Change has to be brought for-
ward by skilled actors, forming coalitions and developing
innovative policies, which eventually will bring about new
institutions more favorable for the realization of sustain-
ability aims.
The article will proceed as follows. The ‘Transition and
its driver’ section looks at the question what actors are
driving transition processes and will identify ways to
analyze their status. It is primarily discussing to what ex-
tent it can be assumed that transition impulses will be ini-
tiated by incumbent or regime actors. This is followed by
a discussion of important trends of decentralization in
the German system of electricity generation (‘Electricity
transitions in Germany’ section). The section addresses
the question what types of decentralized impulses we are
dealing with. The ‘Cases of 100% bio regions’ section in-
troduces four cases in more detail followed by an analysis
of important lines of conflict the local initiatives are
engaged inb.
Transition and its driver
The fact that local and urban governments are increasingly
adopting energy-related policies that aim at a transform-
ation of the electricity supply system is widely acknowl-
edged [5]. Nevertheless, the relevance of the spatial scale
of these initiatives until recently remained often implicit or
underdeveloped in transition approaches [6]. This negli-
gence might have two reasons: on the one hand, socio-
logical approaches do have the tendency to underrate the
role of physical spatial proximity, because they usually as-
sume that closeness in social space is paramount. On the
other hand, a lot of the transition literature is explicitly
technology oriented and takes as its point of departure a
specific technology and studies its pathway towards suc-
cess or failure, being more oriented towards analyzing in-
stitutional elements of technological innovation systemsthen the actual, process-related conditions of institutional
development. Regions and local communities are usually
considered more passively as seedbeds, but not as orig-
inators of powerful transition-oriented initiatives. This,
however, need not be the case. The example of the de-
velopment of solar technology in Germany has amply
shown that the initiative for experimenting with and
developing this technology came from certain local
and/or regional pockets in opposition to developments
on a more central level, be it the federal or state gov-
ernment or the incumbent actors in the field of electri-
city supply [7].
Studies based on the multi-level perspective [8-10]
identify dynamic processes, which are characterized by
the existence of path dependencies and lock-in phenom-
ena as well as by interdependencies between technical
and social change processes [11-13]. Trajectories of per-
sistence thereby hinder change and are hence essential
for analyzing the reluctant withdrawal from fossil path
dependencies. But there is an acknowledged lack of actor
orientation, as well as comparatively few studies on area-
focused strategies and innovation resources [14,15]. Even
though the innovation niches which are in the focus of
analytical works were attributed to local characters, the
spatial embedding of innovation processes and the dy-
namics of innovation there, negotiation processes, and the
‘battle of the systems’ is neglected [5,16].
Looking at the way local initiatives organize, bringing
about what we will call situative governance, forces us to
engage with the driving forces aiming to create a new
governance structure. Insofar, we look at the ‘roots of
local policy responses to climate change’ [17]. One line of
thinking stresses the role of incumbent actors in initiating
transition processes especially on the local level. Smith
et al. [18] argue that there would be a need to further de-
velop regime endogenous transition perspectives, where
the transition process is conceptualized as the result of in-
cumbent regime actors (local/urban governments) making
conscious and planned efforts in response to perceived
pressures using regime-internal resources. We take issue
with this approach. It is a theoretical as well as an empirical
question to identify and categorize the actors responsible
for bringing forward initiatives towards transformation
or a transition of a regime or the dominating rules within
a field.
We suggest looking at field theory, which is interested
in studying institutional change and stability. The theory
sees fields as the fundamental units of collective action
in society. Fields are constructed by actors who are pur-
suing specific aims. Stable fields are characterized by the
fact that the main actors are able to reproduce them-
selves over longer periods of time, while in unstable
fields, understandings about what the field is all about
and who has power and why are contested. Defenders of
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in conflict with them are challengers. It is important to
note that the social structure of a field is always related
to a common problem with which the actors are con-
cerned. In order to identify who is incumbent and who
is the challenger, it is therefore first of all necessary to
identify what the field is all about. The field of electricity
generation is dominated by the actors responsible for
this task, and there are rules that regulate who under
what conditions is allowed to do what as well as there
are implicit rules concerning what the actors consider to
be legitimate actions. So for example, the big energy
providers in Germany for a long time did not venture
into territory that was supposed to belong to a fellow en-
ergy provider. Insofar, the four big German energy pro-
viders still are regionally concentrated, and the market is
generally divided up between them.
The theory of strategic action fields [2,3] claims to be
able to answer the question, how and under what condi-
tions relatively powerless actors are able to mobilize and
(re)organize fields, in our case, electricity supply infrastruc-
tures. It helps us to analyze the actions of challenger actors
on a local level, which eventually might contribute to a
change in the overall system. As outlined above, the theory
claims that usually an incumbent-challenger structure is
present, if aims in a field are contested. It further claims
that incumbents will be usually interested in defending the
status quo, while challengers will try to inflict damage on
the incumbents and try to change the status quo. The the-
ory (as well as the many empirical studies that have been
done in the institutionalist tradition) would not make us
expect that incumbents are eager to significantly change
the structures of the field from which they benefit or that
they would in fact be the drivers for creating a sustainable
urban regime adjustment.
In my mind, the debate about the role of incumbents
in transition processes can be solved analytically. Many
case studies stress the role of mayors or city councils in
developing plans for sustainability and energy transitions.
Observers sometimes consider them the incumbents, be-
cause they possess at a specific moment a political power-
ful position. State actors or political actors, however, are
usually not competing in the field under investigation
proper, e.g., electricity supply. They are on the outside try-
ing to regulate the field. The field of electricity supply is
populated by the actors responsible for providing energy.
Political decision makers then and there concern them-
selves with energy questions, but are not routinely in-
volved in the business. If the system of energy provision
changes due to new political decisions, this is the result of
bargaining mainly between politicians and very often the
result of changing majorities. If the mayor or city council
wants to change the energy system, she has to engage with
the incumbent actors in the field who will usually try toresist changes that would result in a change of their status.
This differentiation is useful to make, because it sheds
light on the different games actors play and the different
logics that drive the activities of actors [19]. Mobilizing a
community and generating electricity at market prices are
two different things that can influence each other but are
following different logics.
Quitzau et al. claim that an ‘… endogenous perspective
suggests a need for more institutionally entrenched transi-
tion typologies’ [20]. This argument is well taken, but
there seems to be no need to take the supposedly trans-
forming actions of incumbent actors as the starting point
for further developing transition-oriented typologies. Re-
gimes in this context need not be considered as something
being solely restrictive. Regimes also have an enabling role.
Without regimes and the security for decision-making
they offer to both private and public actors, a lot of activ-
ities would not be happening or would be frustrated due
to a lack of perspective. For example, the development of
renewable energies in Germany could only take off once
there was something like a regime that made it possible
for the relevant actors to make decisions reaching into the
future.
This implies that regimes without any doubt are charac-
terized by a certain stability (dominant actors, rules, cog-
nitive frames, and legitimate actions), but that does not
mean that only uniform behavior can be observed. Regime
actors are of course constantly adapting to new circum-
stances; they are trying to keep their position even when
faced with a turbulent or threatening environment. Thus,
slight changes in the strategies of incumbent actors are
quite a normal incidence. They are not threatening the re-
gime but strengthening it.
The claim that transition theory underrates ‘… the po-
tential of incumbent regime actors as orchestrators of
transitional change. By means of their skills in situated in-
terpretations and creativity, such actors may also use re-
gime rules to consciously modify traditional patterns of
associations among flows of socio-technical systems’ [20]
has to be seen in this light both as a theoretical claim, for
which we see no justificationc as well as an empirical
claim, which of course can be verified or falsified. We will
further explore our argument about the importance of the
social structure of fields and the position of actors within
the field by looking at an important recent contribution to
the transition discussion.
Hargreaves et al. [21] have highlighted the role of inter-
mediaries for local and regional projects. In fact, organiz-
ing and having organizational support are crucial for a
project to be successful, and if an ongoing project aims to
have a broader impact, de-localized forms of organization
have to be found. Hargreaves et al. [21] stress that along
with the growing maturity of local innovation projects, the
role of intermediaries increases, which is sensible given
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projects will have to take into account available know-
ledge. On the other hand, many projects are embedded
in programs, support schemes, etc. and do not have only
a local or regional aim but intend to have a larger im-
pact on the whole system of electricity generation or
even how the architecture of the society as a whole
should look like. Insofar, it seems more than reasonable
to suggest that new professionalized knowledge grad-
ually develops, with its own set of specialists and more
general ideas about how things are best done. In the ter-
minology of sociological neo-institutionalism, we can de-
tect processes of isomorphism.
The authors furthermore stress the specifics of local
innovation projects (in contrast to market-oriented pro-
jects). In our mind, however, the difference should not be
seen in the local character of the initiatives as such, but in
the uncertainties surrounding their activities as they are
challenging the incumbents. The authors (a) rightly stress
that local initiatives show an amazing breadth of distinct
organizational forms. A broad range of organizational
types encompassing cooperatives, voluntary associa-
tions, informal community groups, etc. can be found.
It has to be added, however, that local initiatives might
also create companies, and entrepreneurial people are
wary about the organizational form that best suits their
ambitions. (b) Furthermore, there are different resource
bases: voluntary labor, grant funding, etc. This can also be
claimed for new firm foundations in the electricity sector,
which especially in the founding phase very often depend
on grants, personal, or family resources and have a hard
time making ends meet. On the other hand, both local ini-
tiatives as well as companies in the end have to generate
some kind of income and are equally resource dependent.
(c) There are important divergent contextual situations,
which is equally true for firm foundations as well as local
initiatives. In addition, the authors claim that (d) there are
alternative driving motivations: meeting social needs, pur-
suing ideological commitments. An entrepreneur in the
field of electricity generation might be driven by the same
motives. Again, we can see this when looking at the devel-
opment of the renewables industry in Germany, where
political and social motives were decisive for the develop-
ment of the industry. On the other hand, local initiatives
can aim to generate profits as many of the German exam-
ples we have studied demonstrate.
Hargreaves et al. [21] thus underestimate the common
problems private as well as public actors face when they
are in a situation of challenging the status quo: (a) Both
are unsure about the contours of the future regulatory de-
velopment. (b) Local initiatives as well as new companies
are working with technologies or technology mixes and
intend to offer services linked to specific technological
developments; the viability of which on the long run stillneeds to be proven. New technology developments
(e.g., in the field of energy storage technologies) or regula-
tory developments may delegitimize plans. (c) Just like
firms, local initiatives have to be organized, structured,
and made to work. Finally, (d) local initiatives just like
companies have to do something useful and legitimate in
the eyes of their (potential) clients. Challengers in the field
of electricity generation generally have to cope with a fluid
institutional framework.
Electricity transitions in Germany
An important line of conflict between incumbent and
challenger actors in the electricity system relates to the
extent to which it will have a decentralized architecture.
This is not a purely technological problem. Renewable
energies could also be harvested and run in a more cen-
tralized manner by using big solar farms and huge (off
shore) wind parks, administered, e.g., by the established
big energy providers. This could also be called sustain-
able. However, most actors on the local level are inspired
by the idea that electricity generation should be dramat-
ically decentralized in both technological as well as
organizational form. This is not only a German discus-
sion. Many urban and local governments worldwide are
working on reconfigurations of local energy systems
[22]. Germany, without any doubt, is among the countries
with an especially wide variety of relevant initiatives. This
might appear surprising at first. The German electricity
system used to be characterized by strong local and re-
gional monopolies, but after the liberalization of energy
markets in the late 1990s, these supposedly inefficient
structures were replaced by an oligopolistic system run by
four big energy providers (ENBW, E.ON, Vattenfall, and
RWE), which had divided the market among themselves
along regional lines. In the process of liberalization, there
was a clearly stated political will by actors from the state
and national levels to create powerful and supposedly
competitive big actors. The four energy providers there-
fore were gulping up smaller competitors by various
means. They built their strength on the provision of a
standardized good ‘electricity’, which is mainly produced
in big power stations owned by them and running on
fossil fuels or nuclear power. Insofar, the developments
in the 1990s and in the early years of the new millen-
nium were largely characterized by a process of concen-
tration and centralization.
Somewhat independent from these developments, how-
ever, individual concerned scientists and citizens, later on
local governments, were developing alternatives to the
dominant centralized structures. They were relying espe-
cially (but not exclusively) on renewable energies and were
bypassing the incumbent regime. In the beginning, small
individual sites, in the case of PV, e.g., individual homes
were transformed into sites of electricity generation. These
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heavily opposed by the incumbent energy providers.
Nevertheless, local and urban initiatives were spreading.
Energy providers initially were not attacking these small
initiatives, because they were considered to be too small
and unimportant, but they heavily opposed the promotion
of renewable energy schemes on the political level and the
development of a market framework that would enable
the growth of these technologies.
A change in the composition of the federal govern-
ment in the late 1990s nevertheless enabled new regula-
tory initiatives for renewables, which immediately had a
tremendous effect [7]. Ambitious plans for the develop-
ment of renewable energies in general and a contract for
the gradual phase out of nuclear energy followed. In the
years 2005 to 2008, the early movers were joined by a
huge wave of local initiatives, which were animated by
the success of renewable energies and their economic
and social impact. After another change in the compos-
ition of the German federal government (2009), the frame-
work within which the renewables were dynamically
growing deteriorated and initially the planned phase out
of nuclear power was postponed. Only after the Fukushima
catastrophe (2011) the decision was again revoked,
and political priorities now moved forward to an even
quicker nuclear phase out. The German ‘Energiewende’,
decision of 2011, however, somewhat happened in isola-
tion. It was not accompanied by plans on how and
whether the electricity system should in fact be trans-
formed. The local, regional, and state governments en-
gaged in planning changes to the electricity system felt
strengthened, but the federal government and the incum-
bent energy providers actually tried to stem the wave of
decentralization.
In order to understand the impact of these partially
contradictory developments, one has to take a closer look
at what specific actors actually aim to achieve with their
initiatives and against what and whom and for what and
whom they organize. To collect all these varying attempts
under the umbrella of ‘sustainability transition’ does not
do justice to the complexity of the developments and the
varying lines of conflict between different actors.
At least the following forms of decentralized initiatives
can be distinguished. At first, there are the aforemen-
tioned attempts by individuals or small groups of people
experimenting with new forms of electricity generation
and distribution. This movement went mainstream once;
in the late 1990s, a regulatory framework for the develop-
ment of renewable energies and the feed in of energy into
the grid generated in a decentralized way was passed. The
renaissance of this movement with different aims came
about after 2009 when official energy prices soared and
prices for self-generated energy declined. Now, it became
economically interesting not to feed in self-generatedelectricity into the grid, but use it locally (and thus also
bypassing the regulatory mess into which the law on re-
generative energies meanwhile had degenerated).
Secondly, there are attempts especially by small commu-
nities to become 100% energy self-sufficient. This move-
ment originally was also advanced by challenger groups,
but meanwhile has attracted ‘official’ recognition, and fed-
eral as well as state programs for some years were sup-
porting the development of respective energy plans.
Thirdly, the renegotiation of network concessions on a
local and regional level has to be mentioned. In most
cases, local and regional networks are run by the incum-
bent network operators. In order to be able to do this,
they had been granted concessions by the respective local
authorities. In the wake of the discussion about energy
transitions, the process of granting concessions has been
re-politicized. Against heavy opposition from the incumbent
energy providers, some authorities try to give concessions
to new partners. Between 2007 and 2012, approximately
190 ownership changes in electricity networks have been
recorded, and 170 concessions for electricity and gas sup-
ply were not given to private companies but were granted
to local authorities and local public companies. In Berlin,
the city government tries to buy back the urban network
(forestalling a public initiative with even more far-reaching
aims), and in Hamburg, a citizen initiative forced the city
government to negotiate a buyout of the incumbent energy
provider against its will.
Fourthly, one of the partners getting a network conces-
sion might actually be an old partner. In the wake of the
market liberalization, the old urban and local energy pro-
viders with some notable exceptions had lost their import-
ance. Now, some of them are being re-vitalized (e.g., by
competing for new concessions) or are newly founded.
Since 2007, at least 60 new foundations of urban energy
providers (a process that has by the way a strong regional
flavor especially in Baden-Württemberg) were registered
and 600 foundations of new energy cooperatives [23,24].
These developments show an interesting, sometimes con-
fusing organizational mix. We can find wholly public as
well as wholly private energy providers. Between these
two poles, there is a mix of public-private partnerships
with a varying mix of minority-majority shareholders.
Gerstlberger [25] distinguishes three types of new urban
energy providers with partnership constellations emerging
in this phase: local privatizations with a participation of
national or regional energy providers, international privat-
izations with a participation of an international energy
provider, and privatizations with the participation of an in-
vestor which does not belong to the energy field proper.
This mixture of organizational forms and the differenti-
ation of actors render it difficult to detect an overall line
of development with respect to, e.g., sustainability aims.
However, this mixture is a clear indicator for a field in
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yet to be established.
These developments should not only to be seen in the
context that various actors for different reasons become
interested in energy issues but also in the context of a
roll back of the so-called ‘New Public Management’ move-
ment. Not only in the field of energy a revitalization of the
role of local governments can be observed. After disap-
pointing experiences with privatizations, many entities are
re-conceptualizing the role of local activities [26]. This re-
fers both to sourcing back activities that had been previ-
ously outsourced to private actors as well as generally to
a new legitimation for economic activities run by local
governments. Energy questions in this respect are newly
discovered as a legitimate and potentially economically
profitable field of activities for local governments.
Cases of 100% bio regions
Given the scope and space limits of this article, we will
not be able to analyze all the different types of local
initiatives. We will instead focus on one clearly deline-
able sub-group, the so-called 100% bio regions, in which,
nevertheless, all four mentioned types of decentralization
can be found. These initiatives have as a common charac-
teristic that they want to become independent from en-
ergy generated outside the respective region and intend to
use only renewable energies for electricity generation. In-
sofar, they are following aims of sustainability. The first
ideas were developed in the 1990s, and one decade later,
the federal, state, and European money became available
for the development of respective plans. The task of iden-
tifying 100% bio regions is made easier with the help of
available directories and organizations representing these
initiatives. Nevertheless, it is difficult to give a precise
number of operating initiatives that have gone beyond set-
ting up a plan and are implementing real changes. We
know that there are spatial concentrations of these initia-
tives. One is in the northeastern state of Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern. In this economically peripheral area, the
availability of public seed money for setting up plans was
decisive. Another concentration is in the southwestern
state of Baden-Württemberg. In this economically pros-
pering region, the strong influence of an environmentally
minded civil society and engaged citizens was decisive.
Our empirical analysis concentrates on the initiatives in
the south of Germany. The south of Germany can be
characterized by economic prosperity, low unemployment,
and firmly established institutions. Out of the available set
of operating initiatives, we selected four cases for a de-
tailed analysis, which exhibited a variance along two cat-
egories of special importance for our research. Based on
an analysis of the aims stated by the organizers of the ini-
tiatives, we distinguished between aims that are oriented
mainly towards inward energy production and those thatare aiming at (also) exporting generated energy. All initia-
tives need to have a viable business plan (otherwise, no
public money would have been available). They differ in
the extent to which a profit orientation is prominent. This
is also reflected in the type of organization that is being
set up to implement the 100% bio energy aims (profit vs.
non-profit organization). Secondly, we considered it im-
portant to distinguish between initiatives which had been
initiated and developed mainly by locals and initiatives in
which outside actors play a dominant role.
The procedure of case selection in a formalized way
thus was based on two observations. One refers to the
definition of the population, the other to the selection of
cases. The population of possible cases can be character-
ized as representative regions, which embodied the new
paradigm of the energy transition (100% renewable en-
ergy regions) with public funding. This means that the
regions do represent a specific set of special conditions
and social phenomena by the construction of specific
governance structures underlying the goal to achieve an
energy supply based on 100% renewable energies [27].
The second argument provides the basis for the con-
struction of a functional model. As it can be seen below,
the model consists of four cases (regional fields) based
on differences in the composition of the group of chal-
lenger actors assuming that specific structural and
organizational designs will be influenced by the type of
challenger actors to be found. The model aims to sample
the maximum of variation and heterogeneity to under-
stand how the phenomena can be seen with respect to
different actor types. Let us take a look at the four cases.
Case 1: Region Hegau Bodensee, private actor. In this
region, the goal of the energy transition had been ad-
vanced by Solarcomplex AG. The company works as
an alternative municipal utility and aims to supply the
Bodensee region with 100% renewable energies by the year
2030. The Solarcomplex AG invests, in particular, in solar
energy and bioenergy villages. It acts as an institutional
entrepreneur and was pioneering the development of
business cases in the field of renewable energies. The
framing of the initiative is characterized by stressing the
economic potential of renewables (‘growth by nature’) and
an emphasis on re-communalization. Since medium-sized
cities are part of this region, urban utilities are newly cre-
ated or revitalized. The region does not possess power
plants of its own and is therefore up to 90% dependent on
electricity coming from outside the region. Ten percent
are domestic renewables (2013), mainly solar from
individual sites, which are not owned or managed by
Solarcomplex.
The company ‘Solarcomplex’ is interesting because it
originated from a citizen action group, which later did
spin out a private company, which eventually turned
into a publicly listed company. It is, at the same time,
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goal of 100% renewables and takes considerable risks in
this gamble. Given the liberalized architecture of energy
supply just as in the other cases, each community (or let
us better say a significant proportion of households)
within each serviceable part of the region needs to be
persuaded to participate in the transition. Some local
utilities have been coopted into the process but not all
of them. This makes for a mixture of cooperation and
conflict. The organizational forms chosen for the energy
provision in the different communities differ. There are
some general principles and technological priorities (biogas
and biomass), but otherwise, the specific local constellation
is taken under consideration.
Case 2: Region Neumarkt i.d. Oberpfalz, public-private
actor. The regional management of the development
concept for achieving a 100% renewable energies supply
is coordinated by the regional innovation agency Regina.
It is run and supported by a host of actors from within
and outside the region (e.g., Bavarian State Ministry for
Economy, Infrastructure, Transportation and Technology;
Bavarian Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Forests;
Bavarian State Ministry for the Environment and Health;
European Community; Sparkasse Neumarkt i.d.OPf.; and
Banking Cooperative Neumarkt i.d.OPf.). The region
follows the vision of a sustainable regional development,
including the supply of 100% renewable energies.
Neumarkt is an example for a late-comer region and
one whose plans have been advanced by politicians which
essentially react to the incentives set by programs of the
respective state (Bavaria), the federal government, and the
European Union. Compared to the previous case with re-
gard to governance structures, the administrative domin-
ance is remarkable. Administrative units have been created
and a special organization to further the case. The pro-
gram framing stresses the issue of a sustainable regional
development mirroring largely the official political state-
ments from the state government.
Case 3: Region Hohenlohe-Odenwald-Tauber, Verband
Abfallwirtschaftsgesellschaft des Neckar-Odenwald-Kreises
mbH (AWN), public actor. The concept of the Bioenergy
Region Hohenlohe-Odenwald-Tauber was developed by
an association called Abfallwirtschaftsgesellschaft Neckar-
Odenwald Kreis (AWN). It is a profit-oriented company
100% owned by regional public bodies. The region aims to
become a zero-emission region by supporting the gener-
ation of renewable energies.
The origins of this initiative can be traced back to dis-
cussions about waste disposal. This is actually a trait,
which is to be found in other initiatives as well. The
search for new ways to dispose of waste not using land-
fills or building waste burning plants in the 1980s has
led three communities to create a company charged with
solving this problem. This company eventually thoughtabout ways to turn waste into energy and gradually de-
veloped plans for a re-orientation of the energy supply
system. This is a non-profit company, and the communi-
ties engaged in this project very strongly stress the issue
of ‘autarky’.
Case 4: Region Südschwarzwald, Südschwarzwald e.V.
The key actor of the campaign Bioenergieregion Südsch-
warzwald plus is the association Südschwarzwald e.V. It
has been set up by five counties. The campaign works
for the expansion of bioenergy in the region with the ob-
jective of supporting municipalities and villages on the
way towards becoming biomunicipalities and biovillages.
It stresses the use of available biomass, which is supposed
to bring in line available natural resources and social
structures, as well as climate and environmental goals.
This is the initiative with the longest history, and at
the same time, it is the most successful one. Its history
can be traced back to a citizen initiative called ‘Parents
for a nuclear free future’ (1986). It provided the nucleus
for discussions about a new local energy supply system
that would not need to rely on nuclear energy. For this
purpose, the idea of a new local energy supplier was ad-
vanced. Respective plans were rejected by the sitting ma-
jority of the local council. The citizen action group
nevertheless made this idea the central topic of the next
local elections, and its supporters actually won a majority
of the seats. They were immediately cancelling a contract
with the incumbent energy provider. A citizen initiative
could successfully stage a local referendum against this de-
cision, but failed. Eventually, a green utility was formed,
which soon began to work not only within the regional
boundaries but also went beyond to spread the idea of
electricity supply without nuclear energy. It merged with a
vivid environmental movement in the area and various en-
vironmentally oriented networks. This has been a success-
ful strategy, and an influential provider was established,
which, however, for business reasons, looks highly critical
on other decentralized initiatives in the region, which
could damage their business prospects.
These four initiatives for some years have received
public seed money, but they cannot be interpreted as re-
gime projects. As the short historical sketches pointed
out, the initiatives existed before they were ‘officially’ rec-
ognized and have aims that go beyond the funding cycle.
The short sketches also demonstrated the idiosyncratic
character of the initiatives and the broad mix of involved
actors.
As mentioned, the cases are aligned along two dimen-
sions (see Table 1). The first one being who was the
driving actor in the development of the local initiative?
We distinguish between an endogenous development in
which the driving forces mainly come from inside the
community and an exogenous development, in which
the development was driven by actors from outside the
Table 1 Cases and actor constellations
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actor who actively addresses local communities and
tries to convince them that to go renewables is a socially
desirable as well as an economically feasible goal.
The pioneer local communities, however, have been
usually been mobilized by endogenous actors. A typical
case is the community with a newly elected mayor with
‘green’ credentials, who had good personal connections
to experts in the field of renewables. In our case, a bioe-
nergy pioneer, who later on founded a related company,
was living in the same community as the mayor. The
two of them convinced the local council and later on a
majority of the population that the community should
go ‘bio’. Initially, this could be done without much exter-
nal interference or help.
A second line of distinction separates cases in which
the economic motive is dominating from those in which
the profit orientation is secondary or ruled out by the
organizational form chosen by the community to re-
organize energy supply (e.g., registered association). The
economic viability of all projects with a financial contri-
bution of local budgets has to be guaranteed, neverthe-
less. Otherwise, upper-level control units could derail
the projects easily. But it is a decisive distinction whether
the community looks upon the projects as a means to
provide new profits, especially by exporting not needed
energy to other communities or the grid, or not.
External actors usually have a more or less clear idea
about how activities among the main actors involved in
the initiatives shall be coordinated. Solarcomplex AG as
well as ministries has a blueprint that is adapted to local
conditions and therefore is still to a certain extent idiosyn-
cratic, but nevertheless clearly recognizable and ‘stable’.
Initiatives advanced by endogenous actors show a greater
variance in their governance setup and might change this
setup more easily over time. The aforementioned example
of the green mayor is linked with a story from an initial
concentration on bioenergy, which was replaced by a
failed attempt to switch to wind power and finally a
massive installation of solar panels with differing coali-
tions and organizations being established to pursue the
green goals. This last example also shows that the choice
of technologies and the development of technology mixes
are dependent on local conditions and contingent power
constellations.Lines of conflict
Without a consideration of the sources of potential oppos-
ition, we cannot assess the effectiveness of the attempts
towards field change. Generally, institutional resilience is
liable to damage the chances for change. Resilience, how-
ever, is a variable, and its effects may be to channel rather
than simply to obstruct change. The conflict with the in-
cumbent actors is usually not a zero-sum game. The in-
cumbents at the beginning will try to oppose any change,
but long-term mobilization efforts will also lead to at-
tempts towards cooptation or building coalitions with the
challengers. What are the main lines of conflict between
actors who want to reorganize and the incumbents around
which the battle for reorganization is waged in our cases
and more generally for decentralization initiatives?
Electricity networks constituting something like a nat-
ural monopoly on the local and regional level are admin-
istered by energy providers, which have been granted
concessions by the responsible public authority. These
providers eventually may also own the physical network
infrastructure. If local authorities want to buy back the
concessions, cancel the concessions or revoke them, they
usually face heavy resistance from the incumbent actors
as could be seen in our cases. They are offering sticks
(courts, high prices and costs, refusal to hand over data,
etc.) and some carrots (higher fees, more participation,
etc.). Very often, the network operators are linked to
specific political actors in the community, which immedi-
ately politicizes the conflict. In many cases cross owner-
ship problems play an important role. Local communities
can be among the ‘owners’ of the big energy providers (in
the same way as new green providers can also be commu-
nity owned). Insofar, they should have an interest in their
well-being since the energy providers (at least in the
golden days of the past) provided a steady flow of income
to the local communities. In addition, since the system of
electricity supply is highly politicized, many (former) poli-
ticians are employees or even managers of the incumbent
energy providers. Insofar, it is no wonder that one import-
ant line of conflict always centers around the relationship
between local communities and the big energy providers.
In our bioenergy case, the new local network operator
was forced to sell his business back to the dominant net-
work operator. Due to the growing local electricity pro-
duction, the increasing interconnection problems with
the grid, and steadily increasing regulatory requirements,
it could not any longer fulfill its role and the fastest and
easiest way out was to sell back. The energy provider
promised not to unravel the local energy system, which
did get various prizes for being outstanding, but the ini-
tial contacts also demonstrated clearly that it is in this
business for different reasons than the local community.
An expertise for the German parliament enumerated
the strategies used by the incumbent energy providers to
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ners. In spite of the fact that there are regulations that
fix the prizes that have to be paid for regaining control
over the network infrastructure, the energy providers
routinely demand too high prices. Smaller communities
lag the expertise necessary to counter these evaluations
and are avoiding lengthy and potentially costly juristic
struggles. Another method is to prolong the bargaining.
Regulations now say that if no compromise can be found
within a year after the concession has been cancelled,
the old network operator can operate the network without
having to pay a concession fee. Furthermore, the incum-
bent network operators can try to avoid communicating
data that are necessary for running the network and/or es-
tablishing its actual worth. There have also been cases
were manipulated data have been handed over. Threaten-
ing court action, withdrawal of sponsorships for sports
and cultural activities, and firing personnel from the com-
munity are some other methods used by incumbentsd.
The relationship between communities and energy pro-
viders also has an infrastructure component reaching
beyond the limits of the community. Neither at the be-
ginning of the transition nor later on local communities
will be able to do without a connection to the general
grid. The justification may be the dominance of volatile
energy sources (wind and solar) or the necessity to have
a backup if local or regional energy resources do not
work according to plan. One of the bio-communities
managed by Solarcomplex produces more electricity
than it needs by itself. Nevertheless, at the moment, it is
dependent for a continuous electricity supply on its
connection to the overall grid. The reason in this case is
that due to the lack of affordable energy storage tech-
nologies, the electricity generated cannot be used at the
time when it is most needed, but only at the time when
it is produced. This might change from medium to long
term due to technological developments, but it consti-
tutes a significant problem for many local communities.
Furthermore, plans are discussed by the federal govern-
ment and propagated by the energy providers to charge
the connection to the grid instead of the amount of
electricity actually used. This would disadvantage local
communities and make their efforts more costly.
These conflicts between challengers and incumbents
were present in all cases examined. The intensity of the
conflict varied. An important balancing role is played by
old local network operators or local energy providers,
which can shift allegiances and can leave the coalition
with the potentially losing incumbent to enter coalitions
with a new one consisting of local actors.
In order to be able to build up opposition to the in-
cumbent actors, the challengers need to mobilize ordin-
ary citizens. A change in the system of electricity supply
involves that citizens cancel existing contracts, sign newones with a hitherto unproven organization, and often
take up liabilities of their own (in the form of credits,
buying new equipment, etc.). This is no easy feat. Theor-
etically speaking, the existing system of electricity supply
has solved coordination problems both for consumers
and regulators. This can be considered to be an equilib-
rium, and once actors have coordinated on one, they
have little incentive to alter their behavior. Solarcomplex
AG demanded in one case studied that 60% of the local
households switch provider before they would even start
building a new installation. The formidable difficulties
involved in coordinating multiple actors around some
possible institutional alternative hamper the prospects
for revision. This is especially so, since the established
system of electricity supply does not pose tangible prob-
lems (e.g., in the form of blackouts).
The mobilizers in all cases analyzed try to overcome
this problem by blending the general issue of climate
change and sustainability with elements of regional self-
sufficiency and regional pride. The dominating narra-
tives are ‘we are doing something about the environ-
ment’ and ‘we are strengthening our community’. This
also implies that in many cases, a reflection in what direc-
tion the community should develop soon follows. Within
the communities, resistance against such plans regularly
comes from farmers, at least from parts of the farming
population. The support of famers in most cases is neces-
sary because their land is needed for various purposes. On
the other hand, there are farmers who feel threatened by
these developments. They fear an increase of the rent for
the land they use for agricultural purposes and are feeling
uneasy or are even envious towards a new breed of energy
farmers who seem to earn money for doing nothing.
Conclusion
The German federal government has stated that up until
2050, 80% of the electricity consumed shall come from
renewable energies. At the moment, the contribution of
renewables is slightly above 25%. Existing plans do not
spell out how and by who with what technologies this
political aim is supposed to be achieved. Our paper started
with the assumption that cities and local and regional
communities are at the forefront of efforts to change
the electricity supply system in Germany [28]. Long be-
fore the government has made its decision, citizen ac-
tion groups, NGOs, and local political action groups
have become active organizing to achieve the ‘energy
transition’. It is widely acknowledged that if the govern-
ment sticks to its aims, not only nuclear power plants
but also other conventional power plants (coal and gas)
will have to be shut down and replaced by smaller more
dispersed entities of power generation. Decentralization
in this context is not only a technological question but
also a broader socio-technical one related to emergent
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future be run by the same actors as the present one, fol-
lowing broadly the same strategic imperatives, or will it
be run by new actors like local coalitions, investment
funds, and new field entrants?
We are assuming that spatial, context specific factors
are important for understanding the development and
eventual shape of local initiatives. We have claimed that
initiatives are advanced by a heterogeneous group of ac-
tors, with varying aims, which take under consideration
local power constellations, spatial conditions, and the
existing set of technological options. Insofar, spatial ele-
ments (of a social as well as ecological nature), political
conditions, economic structures, settlement profiles, and
available material resources (wind, sun, wood, and bio-
mass) matter. In the present phase of the energy transi-
tion, we are able to observe a kind of division of labor in
the sense of a space-specific specialization of innovation
profiles (e.g., solar cities, bio-energy regions, and energy
services region).
There still remains a wide array of open empirical and
analytical questions, however, that need to be addressed.
Most local initiatives face a difficult time at the moment,
and it will be interesting to see whether specific institutional-
and/or actor-related characteristics can contribute to the
resilience of energy initiatives. We found that local initiatives
vary greatly in the technological mixes they are choosing,
the way they organize, the organizations they eventually
setup, and the measures they employ. We gather that the
variety of ensuing governance configurations will decrease
over time, either (a) because the regulatory framework
under discussion at the federal level will require certain
adjustments, (b) because certain local realizations become
considered as success cases and will therefore be imitated
by others, and (c) as Hargreaves et al. [21] have estab-
lished, because intermediaries play an increasing role in
the process, which will lead to a professionalization and
supposedly homogenization of practices.
It also remains an open question whether the local ini-
tiatives can hang on to their role as challengers to the old
system and lead the way towards a new electricity system.
At the moment, the incumbents, supported by the federal
government, are reorganizing and are attempting to inte-
grate initiatives towards mainly technical decentralization
under a new centralized management with the local initia-
tives fulfilling roles of decentralized energy generation
within a pre-determined framework that will give them
only a little space to maneuver. This would change the
transition path from one being mostly emergent to one
being managed. The incumbent actors still dominate the
electricity supply sector, they own power plants and net-
work concessions, they are well organized, and they have
well-established connections to the field of politics and
power. The local initiatives on the other hand have littlecommon interests and are, by far, less well organized and
especially since the demise of the red-green coalition on
the federal level has lost direct access to political decision-
making circles. On the other hand, they still can rely on a
broad general public sentiment in favor of renewables and
against the old incumbents.
We suggest that in order to avoid the concentration of
the analysis on one or only a few cases, the theory of
strategic action fields could be of benefit in order to
reach results that are more generic. It directs our atten-
tion to the social structure of fields, the dominant actors,
and strategies and forms of organization chosen, as well
as the dominant lines of conflict. Given the diversity of
actors involved, strategies developed, and organizational
forms established, we could definitely talk about an
emergent field that is not yet stabilized. Insofar, it is also
very difficult to say which of the analyzed initiatives at
the end will survive and what influence they will have on
the overall transition of the energy system and the spe-
cific sustainability pathway. Theoretically, there seems to
be a limited set of possible outcomes of a transition process.
Option one would be for the incumbent actors to survive
based on new coalitions they are engaged in, cooptation,
and political support. Option two would be a differentiation
of the field like we had in the period between 1999 and
approximately 2008, when two parallel institutions, one
for renewable energies and one for conventional energies,
were developed in parallel. Political attempts at present
aiming to create a new common regulatory framework for
all types of energy sources seem to make this solution not
very probable. We could also face a continuing period of
insecurity. In other words, a prolongation of the present
situation in which all actors are demanding more straight-
forward and clear decisions by the government which do
not come forward, however. Furthermore, we could ex-
perience a wholesale transformation of the field. The
eventual outcome is unclear, but it is obvious that local
initiatives have played and still will play a pioneering role
for the energy transition in Germany.
Endnotes
aIn the following, we will make no distinction be-
tween local, urban, and regional attempts towards devel-
oping plans for energy transitions. The decentralized
character of these initiatives, which put them into oppos-
ition to the dominating centralized architecture, is the
most important common element for the purposes of this
study.
bThe article is based on preliminary empirical results
from two ongoing projects. One is financed by the
Helmholtz Association and the state government of
Baden-Württemberg, the second one is funded by the
German Federal Ministry for Research and Education
(FONA-program).
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weaken the regime in which they are the incumbent actor
begs the question why they should do this.
dFor a comprehensive overview and evaluation, see [29].
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